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Introduction 
Over the course of the Twentieth, and now Twenty-first Centuries, America has seen a 
profound drama play out in its cities. Having embraced the goal of creating integrated cities, it 
has seen once mighty bastions of wealth descend into decades of decay, as affluent, white 
communities took their capital to the suburban periphery, leaving the urban core in shambles. 
However, as the last century came to a close and the new one began, white wealth returned. 
Scholars believed that this re-development could bring, not only economic renewal, but also a 
social re-birth for impoverished communities that had fallen prey to pathologies, in the midst of 
their depravity. By and large, this transformative synthesis has not manifested itself. Instead, the 
vestiges and continuing legacy of historical, racial injustice have conspired to permit deep, social 
fissures to endure. Ultimately, the merging of demographic groups have actually worsened the 
condition of the low income communities it was supposed to revive. They find themselves more 
alienated and endangered than ever before. By exploring this history, we can begin to understand 
why. 
Before I begin this analysis, I will acknowledge one thing. Recent history has shown that 
gentrification is not solely a racial phenomenon. Middle-class African American have found 
themselves, at times, displacing long-tenured residents, and low-income white communities have 
found themselves displaced. This paper, however, focuses on the relationship between historical 
racial policies and their impact on modern gentrification. The intention of this emphasis is not to 
diminish the plight of white residents displaced by gentrification. Rather, it is an 
acknowledgment of the peculiarities of low income communities of color’s experience with 
urban, economic development. By analyzing these peculiarities, we can better understand the 
broader context in which all gentrification takes place. 
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The structure of this paper proceeds as follows. It begins by situating itself within the 
broader scholarly discourse on gentrification and then provides a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the efficacy of any development effort. To do this, it employs the work of Sen and 
Appadurai, to help explain development as the development of people, rather than the 
development of place. Then, it lays out the historical context for modern, American 
gentrification. First, by examining the transformation of Paris which has served as a model for 
urban re-development ever since. Second, it shows how U.S. policy created and now chips away 
at the American slum. Finally, it returns to Appadurai and Sen to analyze how policies of urban 
development have failed to provide low income communities of color with the capacity to aspire 
and the freedom that development ought to impart. 
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
Section 1: Context within literature 
 
It is important to contextualize the analysis of this paper within the existing scholarly 
discourse on gentrification. While there is broad disagreement on normative statements as to 
whether the phenomenon is “good” or “bad,” these arguments have largely centered on the 
question of whether or not gentrification necessarily entails the displacement of long-tenured, 
low-income residents. To the extent that it does, these argument have examined how displaced 
residents’ satisfaction with their new housing options compares to their satisfaction with their 
new accommodations compares to their views on their previous residence. Lastly, there is 
ongoing disagreement about where the population engaging in gentrification is coming from and 
where the displaced settle, post-gentrification. 
Views on these questions are mixed. Atkinson (2004) maintains fidelity to a 
conceptualization of gentrification that by definition entails displacement. However, Freeman 
(2005) holds that the rate of mobility among low-income residents is in fact lower in gentrifying 
neighborhoods. Low-income residents, grateful for the improvement in public services, choose to 
pay more of their income to reside in gentrified neighborhoods1. While he has since moderated 
his stance on the matter (Davidson 2014), following widespread criticism, he maintains that an 
inherent assumption that displacement will occur as a result of gentrification is unwarranted. 
Lastly, even though Goetz (2011) notes that low-income recipients of housing vouchers, 
displaced by the redevelopment of former public housing sites, often wind up in other, equally 
low-income and racially segregated neighborhoods, Vigdor (2002) points to survey data that 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that, in some cases, his qualitative analysis of gentrifying neighborhoods found evidence of 
resentment among tenured residents about the fact that those supposedly “public” and universal services did not 
improve until more affluent moved in, implicitly suggesting that those original inhabitants are less deserving 
members of the body politic. 
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indicate that displaced individuals often express equal, if not greater satisfaction with their new 
accommodations.       
The analysis found within this paper builds off this discourse, but is not contingent on the 
assertion of any definitive declarations about the necessity of including displacement in our 
understanding of gentrification. It acknowledges the fluid nature of neighborhood change and the 
possibility that gentrification might manifest itself differently in various geographic and temporal 
contexts. Instead, it places its emphasis elsewhere. Namely, this analysis endeavors to place 
current patterns of gentrification within the context of a larger narrative of integration and 
segregation, in American residential patterns witnessed over the course of eight decades. 
Regardless of whether it results in displacement or not, gentrification necessarily entails at least 
some period of integration, even if it is merely a mid-point between two equally-segregated 
equilibria. Its aim, therefore, is not merely to gauge whether or not gentrification causes 
displacement. Its aim is to assess whether or not the dispersion of concentrated poverty has 
yielded the type of human development advocated by Sen and Appadurai, along with the 
acculturation of the poor predicted and supported by critics of concentrated poverty.      
Section 2: Critical framework 
At the heart of this paper is the notion of what it means to develop a neighborhood and its 
inhabitants. On this point, its analysis diverges from what has become the orthodox 
understanding of development, which holds that “[G]rowth has been much more of a lifesaver to 
the poor than redistribution” (Easterly 2001, 14). For this cosmology, the metric of income, in its 
various permutations (personal, national, regional annual median) has assumed an almost holy 
status as an infallible metric of progress. The difficulties of producing a comprehensive 
assessment of particular real income—one that is adjusted for the cost of living in each 
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respective region as opposed to one that is compared to a national inflation rate—has led 
development theorists to resign themselves to letting income data speak for itself. 
This analysis, however, draws on a more robust conceptualization of development, as laid 
out by Appadurai and Sen. Sen, for his part says we ought to think of development in terms of 
people having the freedom to live the life they deem valuable. As he points out, African 
Americans have incomes that far exceed those of their counterparts in places such as China and 
India, and yet consistently see worse outcomes (Sen 1999). This is because, “The usefulness of 
wealth lies in the things it allows us to do—the substantive freedoms it helps us achieve.” 
Income must be taken in the context of the cost of living and a broader political and cultural 
context that serves to either limit or expand the opportunities available to the poor. 
Appadurai (2004) casts development in terms of “the capacity to aspire,” the ability for 
the poor to plan, grow and exercise agency in society. While they continue to do all of those 
things, he argues that “Part of poverty is a diminishing of the circumstances in which these 
practices occur” (Ibid.). In its assessment of the gentrification that has occurred in American 
cities over the course of the past two decades, this paper seeks to hold those trends to 
Appadurai’s standard for what true development entails. If economic development in modern 
U.S. cities is in fact this truest form of development, then the marginalized populations of those 
cities should see a heightened capacity to aspire. As my analysis shows, that is simply not the 
case. 
Lastly, as it addresses economic development in an American context, this paper wrestles 
with the concept of integration. Rather than treating gentrification as a novel phenomenon, it 
endeavors to place recent trends in a broader trend of segregation, integration and re-segregation 
that has characterized the residential patterns of this country throughout its history. By necessity, 
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therefore, I analyze the role that hegemonic discourse about the socialization of the “underclass” 
(Wilson 1987) has played in shaping economic development and displacement in cities around 
the country.   
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Chapter 2: Origins of gentrification 
 
Executive Summary 
Chapter 2 uses the historical example of Nineteenth Century Paris as an archetype for 
understanding urban, economic development. It is a model rooted in the notion that poor 
residents are the impediments to development, rather than its intended beneficiaries. Haussmann 
and Paris inspired subsequent generations of urbanists and, as a result, the sins of that rebirth 
are repeated throughout the subsequent history of development contained within this paper. 
 
History 
To find the origins of gentrification, one must look to Nineteenth-Century Paris. At mid-
century, the City of Lights was anything but. As Kunstler pithily puts it, “[Paris] was a political 
tinder box, a continuing public health catastrophe, an unfit place for business” (Kunstler 2001). 
The concerns of health, political control and economic viability were the three legs of stool of 
Paris’s reform and have since become enshrined as the boilerplate for critics of urbanity. Over 
time these concerns would meld and become metaphors for one another, in order to serve the 
interests of the privileged and marginalize the poor. 
The central figure in the reformation (literally) of the city, was the prefect of the Seine, 
Georges Eugène Haussmann. From 1853 to 1869, he oversaw a series of public works initiatives 
that would revive the city, but displace countless working class and establish the prototype for 
countless urban renewal efforts to come. At the outset of his efforts, he had his work cut out for 
him. As stated, the city was politically unstable, with the fomenting of successive revolutions. 
These revolutionary tendencies were “concentrated in densely packed, working-class quartiers, 
which…had complex, illegible street plans” (Scott 1998). The structural lay-out of these 
neighborhoods made them a thicket, out of reach from political authority. 
Similarly, the sanitary conditions of the city were abhorrent. Without any infrastructural 
modernization from its medieval origins, the streets of Paris became a cauldron of disease. 
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Sewage from chamber pots was often simply dumped into the streets, imbuing the city with an 
inescapable stench and a monumental mortality rate. In the lead-up to the ascendance of 
Haussmann, the city had paid dearly for its lake of sanitation. There had been two, successive 
cholera epidemics in 1832 and 1849, resulting in the deaths of 20,000 and 19,000 Parisians, 
respectively (Kunstler 2001). It was in the densest and poorest slums that the city saw the highest 
death tolls.   
In response to this bleak reality, Haussman embarked on an ambitious agenda of radical 
public works projects. In accordance with Enlightenment thinking, which “looked with 
enthusiasm on straight lines and visible order” (Scott 1998), Haussman broadened narrow roads 
into broad boulevards, installed a comprehensive sewage system that was so grand it was a 
sightseeing hit at the 1867 Paris International Exposition, and utilized the technology of Roman 
aqueducts to at long last bring clean drinking water to the City. The straight, thoughtfully-lain 
grid enabled soldiers to expeditiously travel to disparate corners of the city to combat any sparks 
of revolution.   
Whatever empirical benefits resulted from his designs, it would be a grave error to cast 
Haussmann as objective and apolitical. He wrote that the working poor, who comprised the 
majority of the city “were nomadic renters, with no stake in their neighborhoods, prone to 
excessive drinking, easily excited by transitory emotion, and subject to the manipulations of 
communist demagogues” (Kunstler 2001). With that attitude in mind, it should come as no 
surprise that Haussmann conceived of those communities as the impediments to, and not the 
intended beneficiaries of, his remaking of the city. To make way for his sewers, boulevards and 
parks, he displaced thousands of poor Parisians, all in the name of progress. 
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In the wake of this displacement came gentrification. The bourgeoisie moved into those 
neighborhoods and renovated the abandoned buildings they found there. Soon, the city was a 
model for urbanism. The broad boulevards, bathed in the sunlight that had been unable to pierce 
through the slums, were lined with ornate apartment buildings with ground level cafes. These 
boulevards were greened and parks were built to give city-dwellers a taste of the countryside that 
now lay miles away. It was in this way that Haussmann brought about the Paris, now cherished 
around the globe as a city of love and light. 
The efficacy of using Haussmann as a point of departure lies in the fact that the 
redevelopment of Paris became the prototype for urban redevelopment and the genesis of 
gentrification. Indeed, it is not just Haussmann, but his contemporaries, as well, who played out 
the drama that repeats itself to this day. Smith (1996) terms this drama the rise of the “revanchist 
city,” invoking the French elites of the late Nineteenth Century. Revanche is French for revenge, 
and over the course of three decades, this elite exacted revenge against the working classes they 
believed had caused a downfall in the fortunes of France. Paris, therefore, offers the first great 
example of how economic development weds itself to social division. 
Theory 
Sen argues that, “In the freedom-oriented perspective, the liberty of all to participate in 
deciding what traditions to observe cannot be ruled out by the national nor local ‘guardians’” 
(Sen 1999). Using Haussmann’s redevelopment of Paris as a point of departure for understanding 
American segregation, gentrification and economic development is useful, because it lays out the 
basic prototype for subsequent development. In this model, the poor are not the targets of 
development, they are the impediments to it.  
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Even Haussmann’s contemporaries could see this fundamental flaw in his approach to 
development. Engels (1872) used Haussmann as the archetype of a larger, all-too prevalent 
phenomenon: 
By “Haussmann” I mean the practice, which has now become general, of 
making breaches in the working-class quarters of our big cities…irrespective 
of whether this practice is occasioned by considerations of public health and 
beautification or by the demand for big centrally located business premises or 
by traffic requirements, such as the laying down of railways, streets, et 
cetera….This is a striking example of how the bourgeoisie settles the housing 
question in practice. The breeding places of disease…in which the capitalist 
mode of production confines our workers are not abolished; they are merely 
shifted elsewhere. 
A number of crucial points need to be highlighted in Engels’s analysis. First, it is the 
quarters of the working class that are targeted for placing down public improvement. With the 
poor under the complete sway of their “guardians,” as Sen refers to them, they are unable to 
lobby for the burden of making way for public improvement to be shared equally among the 
various strata of society. Second, the justification for the eradication of poor communities need 
not be one of the human development of the poor themselves. The betterment of the elite is 
justification enough. Finally, there is no compulsion to actually address the well-being of the 
poor. The engineers of development can fix their gaze on the physical place. When the poor are 
swept away, these guardians can delude themselves into the belief that the plight of society as a 
whole has been ameliorated. These themes will persist.  
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Chapter 3: Segregation, Integration and Flight 
 
 
Executive Summary 
Chapter 3 chronicles the nascent years of American housing policy. The era detailed involved a 
cyclical transition from segregation to integration and an ultimate return to segregation. The 
chapter shows how these original policies were inextricably shaped by the nation’s commitment 
to racial division. This reality had enduring impacts on the accumulation of wealth for white 
Americans, the lack of it for their black countrymen, and the cumulative impact of these policies 
shaped both groups’ respective capacity to aspire, for decades to come. Moreover, the white 
flight that was induced by forced integration is herein reviewed, as it ultimately yielded the 
urban ghettos that now host gentrification. 
 
History  
In 1934, Congress established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Its charge was 
to help Americans achieve the dream of homeownership, in the face of the Great Depression. 
However, in keeping with the tendencies of most New Deal policies, it was a supposedly 
progressive initiative that ultimately deepened racial iniquity in this country (Coates 2014). Its 
preferential treatment of white homeowners would lay the groundwork for a massive 
accumulation of wealth for white Americans and an equally sizeable loss of wealth for their 
black countrymen. Ultimately, it would initiate the early stages of white flight and the housing 
disparities that followed. 
A practice known as “redlining” was the primary tool for initiating this racial regime. The 
FHA’s major contribution to American homeownership was its willingness to cover mortgage 
insurance, which had previously made homeownership cost-prohibitive for many Americans. 
However, the agency drew up color-coded maps of the country’s housing markets. Those 
neighborhoods that were deemed to be stably white were given an “A” rating, and readily 
received credit. Conversely, predominantly black or transitioning neighborhoods were given a 
lower grade and were outlined in red on the agency’s maps, signifying that those neighborhoods 
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either would not receive credit or that credit would only be given to black homeowners, thus 
perpetuating segregation (Ibid.). 
While redlining began as a government policy, it was quickly adopted by private 
mortgage brokers, as well (Ibid.). Knowing that an influx of black families would cut off 
financing for the neighborhood, real estate brokers vowed not to show black families homes in 
stable white neighborhoods. In rare instances where black families were able to secure housing 
in white neighborhoods, they often faced violence at the hands of white neighbors who were 
either ideologically opposed to integration or riddled with anxiety at the prospect of losing home 
value, as a result of their neighborhoods’ changing ethnic composition. 
While middle class, white Americans were accumulating asset wealth in the form of 
homeownership, housing for black Americans not willing or able to endure discrimination in the 
private market was increasingly being provided in the form of public housing. Though 
theoretically conceived of as a service for Americans of all races, many cities, such as Chicago, 
began instituting income requirements that displaced lower income white families who had been 
on the higher end of eligibility, making housing projects almost exclusively black (Goetz 2011). 
In so doing, the Federal government, in tandem with local partners, enshrined spatial segregation 
and wealth disparities as a fundamental part of American life. 
The nature of the relationship between the Federal government and those local partners 
was equally impactful in shaping these racial dynamics. Initially, the provision of public housing 
was structured as follows. The Federal government provided Local Housing Authorities (LHAs) 
with the funds necessary for the construction of public housing projects. LHAs, in turn, were 
given discretion over where these projects were constructed and charged with using rent revenue 
to cover operating expenses. Responding to public anxiety about an influx of low-income 
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residents of color, LHAs elected to construct projects in parts of metropolitan areas that were 
already heavily black and low-income (Quigley 2000). Moreover, mindful of the aforementioned 
obligation to cover operational expenses, LHAs constructed projects in ways that would 
minimize the cost of upkeep, including small windows and heavy, concrete material (Ibid.). The 
result was an inventory of inhospitable abodes for the nation’s marginalized populations. 
Lastly, in 1949, Congress reauthorized authorization for the provision of public housing, 
in a way that would radically transform the country. Though it espoused the goal of “a decent 
home and a suitable living environment” (Quigley 2000) for all Americans, its political support 
was in fact built upon its capacity for furthering the cause of slum clearance (Goetz 2011). The 
law coupled authorization of public housing construction with a greater mandate for 
municipalities to displace residents, in areas deemed to be blighted. With black communities 
trapped in the urban core as they confronted ongoing discrimination in the housing market, their 
neighborhoods could be consolidated into housing projects and then cleared for re-development. 
With New Deal-era policies initiating the suburbanization of White America and trapping 
Black America in the urban core, American cities increasing, proportionally, became 
increasingly poor and black (Frey 1979). When the Supreme Court ruled in 1954’s Brown v. 
Board of Education that separate was never equal and states had an obligation to provide 
integrated public education, white desire to utilize federal assistance for fleeing the city 
intensified. While studies found that white flight following the experience integration tended to 
stabilize, in the lead-up to the integration of local school white anxiety over the prospect of 
integration triggered an unprecedented exodus (Rossell 1975). 
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Theory  
Appadurai (2004) tells us that, “I am not saying that the poor cannot…plan or aspire. But 
part of poverty is a diminishing of the circumstances, in which these practices occur…Where 
these pathways do exist for the poor, they are likely to be more rigid, less supple and less 
strategically valuable.” Despite the devastation of the Great Depression, the New Deal was an 
era in which interventions by the Federal Government greatly expanded white America’s 
capacity to aspire. The opportunity to own a home, for those white Americans, meant the 
opportunity to begin accumulating asset wealth, not simply for their own benefit, but also as a 
prerequisite to intergenerational transfers of wealth. To the extent that black Americans had the 
opportunity to accumulate the same type of assets, it was confined to zones of divestment, 
ensuring that those assets would depreciate and become a burden, and not a boon to future 
generations of black Americans. 
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Chapter 4: Concentrated poverty and the transition to the marketplace 
  
Executive Summary 
Chapter 4 examines America as it sat, segregated once more, in the wake of its first effort to 
integrate. It examines how the deterioration of living conditions in American ghettos, 
misconstrued as innate, black pathology became the impetus for future approaches to 
integration. The paternalism of white America in its efforts to reform black communities is 
examined in terms of Appadurai’s understanding of poor populations’ attitudes towards 
dominant social norms. The chapter also introduces the notion of economic development being 
wed to social reform efforts.  
History  
As is to be expected, this spatial reordering had a profound economic effect as well. 
Many of the inhabitants of black, inner-city neighborhoods were workers who had migrated from 
the South to the North, in search of manufacturing jobs. By the late 1960s, plants were closing 
and the industrial job base rapidly disappeared. The result was a major concentration of working 
class black families, in the inner city, who were vulnerable to structural economic changes at a 
time of major, structural economic change (Wilson 1987). Consequently, the unemployment and 
poverty rates in these neighborhoods rose dramatically. 
This is not to say there were not jobs, per se. In the wake of deindustrialization, there was 
a massive growth in service-sector jobs. Unfortunately, even if workers in inner city 
neighborhoods were qualified for these jobs, they were not necessarily able to access them. That 
is because the majority of the service sector jobs were created in suburbs, exurbs and non-
metropolitan areas (Ibid.). This concept of distance between jobs and the workforce, known as 
spatial mismatch, meant that many poor, black workers were left without work. 
While there were major economic ramifications for this shift, there were social 
implications as well. Young African Americans trapped in ghettos were increasingly cut off from 
their more affluent peers. Consequently, they lost access to social networks that could lead them 
to finding work and, on an even more basic level, were not exposed to the daily rhythm of 
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neighborhoods filled with the gainfully employed. They began to experience a socialization 
process that cut them off from mainstream America (Ibid.).. 
In the absence of gainful employment, many residents began to turn, instead, to crime. By 
its nature, crime is disproportionately urban. In 1989, it was found that 20% of people living in 
cities with more than a million people had been victims of crime, the previous year, while less 
than a tenth of residents in towns under 10,000 had been (Glaeser 2011). Cities are densely 
packed with strangers and consequently diminish the social pressure that might otherwise inhibit 
the decision to commit a crime against a fellow citizen.  
What happened in the inner-city, however, brought a magnitude that made it categorically 
unique. Chicago, for example, experienced 195 homicides in 1965. In 1970, that number was 
810, and in 1974 it was 970 (Wilson 1987). In 1980, the Robert Taylor Homes projects housed 
0.5% of the city’s population, but was the site of 11% of its murders, 9% of its rapes and 10% of 
its aggravated assaults (Ibid.). Neighborhoods that had previously been stable, mixed-income 
communities were beginning to look like war zones.    
Both the rise in unemployment and the spike in crime conspired to fundamentally weaken 
family structure in inner-city neighborhoods. In 1959, single women were the heads of 30% of 
poor black households, but by 1978 that number had climbed to 74% (Wilson 1987). This was by 
no means an innate cultural phenomenon. Quite the contrary, marital rates among black 
Americans had been higher than those for white Americans in the previous decades (Stevenson 
and Wolfers 2007). However, increasingly black women in the inner city for faced with a cohort 
of black men who were disproportionately unemployed or incarcerated and were thusly deemed 
as poor choices as life partners. 
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The result of these phenomena was that ghettos were no longer seen simply as sites of 
deep poverty, but also social pathology. Therefore, the dispersion of these blighted communities 
could be justified, not only on economic grounds, but also as a service to the residents 
themselves. After all, it was argued, the entrenched behaviors prevented children in these areas 
from being exposed to dominant social norms and given access to social networks that could lead 
to economic opportunity.  
With anxiety over the social ills, real and perceived, of black, urban communities rising, 
Federal housing policy began to evolve. In 1965, Congress passed two provisions that served as 
another inflection point for American housing policy. First, Section 23 allowed LHAs to rent 
private units as a form of public housing. Second, the Turnkey program opened the door for 
private developers to propose and manage affordable housing projects. The result was that low-
income, black residents of public housing could be dispersed from projects and integrated into 
the housing market and the former sites of project buildings could be cleared for re-development. 
Finally, in 1969, Congress ruled that public housing initiatives no longer needed approval from 
local government. Increasingly, the question was becoming how public housing recipients would 
fare in the market, rather than under the guardianship of public authorities (Quigley 2000).  
Theory 
Appadurai draws our attention to the convoluted relationship between the poor and the 
norms of the society that oppresses them. He notes that, “Poor people have a deeply ambivalent 
relationship to the dominant norms of the society in which they live…The other side [of this 
ambivalence] is compliance, not merely surface compliance but fairly deep moral attachment to 
norms and beliefs that directly support their own degradation” (Appadurai 2004). In the history 
of race and housing, in the United States, we see these conflicting themes emerge. African 
 20 
 
American families were deeply immersed in the cultural affinity for homeownership as not 
simply an economic, but also a social indicator of self-actualization.  
However, as they participated in this cult of homeownership, they began to be drawn into 
a process that would undermine the economic and social well-being of both the ghettos that 
developed in the wake of middle-class flight and even the neighborhoods to which the black 
middle class had moved, once their white neighbors departed, in response. Thus, bereft of 
economic opportunity, ghetto communities developed their own rhythms. With available jobs 
trapped in far off suburban communities, from which they were excluded, they made what I 
would in fact argue was the rational decision to embrace the only economic opportunities that 
remained, the underground and illicit. Moreover, with black men all too frequently incarcerated 
or killed, these communities made the equally rational decision to develop familial structures 
built around the centrality of the mother. 
This social deviance, though rooted in rational behavior, drove a deeper wedge between 
low-income black communities and the dominant white society. Ironically, this creates space for 
the emergence of what might be termed a racist commitment to integration. In the discourse of 
this dominant mode of thought, black Americans need to be saved from the influence of their 
neighbors. This creed lays the groundwork for an approach to development that ruptures the 
fabric of black communities, supposedly for their own benefit, conveniently making way for 
massive profits for developers.  
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Chapter 5: Gentrification 
 
Executive Summary 
Chapter 5 shows that gentrification triggered a new wave of integration. Nonetheless, it was a 
form of integration that was often fleeting and was always rooted in the notion that integration 
was the process of the lesser (black America) assimilating into the superior (white America) 
population. As the chapter shows, this conveniently paved the way for massive profits for 
developers able to infiltrate the former sites of public housing. 
History  
Examining the social and economic conditions of the ghetto, at the close of white flight, 
America saw an abundance of social ills. However, a select few saw an opportunity, as well. The 
socio-political upheaval of the past decades had dramatically reduced the value of land in the 
urban core. Nonetheless, that land had a latent value in its proximity to the jobs and 
agglomeration of the center city. For those industrious investors, the gap between the blighted 
present value of the slums and the potential value, if they could be revived, represented one 
thing: profit. However, to understand how the inner city was transformed, it is necessary to 
examine how both delivery of low income housing support and approaches to economic 
development evolved. 
Section 8 of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act furthered the trends 
toward privatization that the Federal government had initiated in the 1960s. Section 8 enabled 
forty year contracts between the Federal government and private developers. The developers 
would collect 25% of residents’ income as rent, with the Federal government picking up the tab 
for the difference between this revenue and operating expenses. Assured of their profits, 
landlords did little to maintain their properties or attract residents. When buildings deteriorated, 
it was simply used as justification to evict residents and hand the property over for private re-
development (Quigley 2000). 
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This last point was incredibly relevant to real estate developers. With job centers 
clustered in the center city and the mass of higher-income Americans living in suburban 
communities, many metropolitan areas experienced what Smith (1982) termed the “land value 
valley.” Going out from the center city, ground rent started high, dropped dramatically as one 
passed through the slums, and crested again in the suburbs. While the ground rent in the slums 
was indeed low in reflection of contemporary conditions, its proximity to downtown was an 
amenity that led to a rent gap, which Smith (1987) defines as the “Gap between the actual 
capitalized ground rent (land value) of a plot of land given its present use and the potential 
ground rent that might be gleaned under a ‘higher and better’ use.” Developers, in short, could 
buy low and sell high. 
However, developers could not transform the projects into luxury lofts on their own; they 
needed government help. Local authorities needed to agree to turn over the projects to be 
redeveloped and provide significant investment to enable the redevelopment (Goetz 2013). In 
their pursuit of the latter, developers found a powerful tool, in the form of tax increment 
financing (TIF). As Weber and O’Neill-Kohl explain, “TIF allows municipalities to designate an 
area for redevelopment and to monetize the expected increase in property taxes to pay for initial 
and ongoing expenditures in the area” (Weber and O’Neill-Kohl 2013). The developers found 
their risk and upfront cost minimized and local jurisdictions could conceivably even make 
money off the deal. Taken at face value, it looked like free money. 
The rise of TIF as a tool for redevelopment had a profound impact on land use and the 
shape of cities, as a whole. This, in many ways, stemmed from the political clout the developers 
themselves managed to amass. In many states, they were integrally involved in writing the 
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legislation and, in some extreme cases, went so far as to represent municipalities at public 
meetings with citizens (Ibid.). A symbiotic, and often corrupt, relationship emerged. 
The interests of the developers were clear. Leveraging their political clout, they began 
“using the crisis of deindustrialization…to normalize the public provision of property tax-based 
subsidies for general-purpose real estate development” (Weber and O’Neill-Kohl 2013). They 
lobbied local governments heavily to convince them that the proper response to 
deindustrialization was not industrial recruitment, but rather commercial real estate development. 
As Weber and O’Neill-Kohl note, developers’ view of urban ghettos was even more 
antagonistic: 
“It was believed that property could be better sanitized in its empty state, thus 
eliminating the possibility of blight returning; therefore, blighted areas needed 
to be removed through massive clearance rather than rehabilitated through 
additional investment…This kind of physical determinism relieves local 
governments of responsibility for the more intractable socioeconomic 
problems that may have led to declining real estate values or abandoned 
property in the first place.” 
Having seen the potential for the dispersal of public housing to give way to profit re-
development, federal housing policy continued to shift further toward low income residents 
being diffuse participants in the marketplace. Claims of social pathology in the ghetto offered a 
moral justification to buttress a policy adjustment that was also conveniently making private 
developers and inordinate amount of money. Simply put, it was believed that black Americans 
needed to be saved from one another. Once they were dispersed, money could be made. After a 
brief increase in the construction of public housing at the beginning of the 1980s, the rate of new 
construction began to atrophy (Quigley 2000). In 1987, the Federal government made low 
income residents’ housing vouchers “portable,” meaning they could be used outside the urban 
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core for which the LHAs had been chartered, in the white, suburban areas where (theorists would 
have us believe) they would finally be properly “socialized.” 
As a part of this shift, from 1994 to 1998, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development embarked on a pilot project called “Moving to Opportunity” (MTO). Families in 
public housing were entered into a lottery and assigned to one of three groups, either receiving a 
voucher to move to a low poverty suburb, a voucher with any constraints or no MTO assistance. 
The results were decidedly mixed. Residents who relocated to the suburbs report high subjective 
self-assessment of their own well-being, but there were few if any sustained improvements to 
economic well-being. In fact, in some cases, boys actually saw an increase in behavioral issues in 
their new environment. Those who received a voucher without stipulations, oftentimes simply 
moved to proximate high poverty communities of color and saw little improvement in their well-
being (Ludwig et al 2013). Nonetheless, the shift to vouchers and tenant-based subsidies went on 
unabated. 
Theory 
The evolution of housing policy at this stage illustrates Sen’s conceptualization of local 
guardians and unfreedoms. He writes that, “Quite often economic insecurity can relate to 
democratic rights…Authoritarian rulers, who are themselves rarely affected by famines…tend to 
lack the incentive to take timely preventative measures” (Sen 1999). The landlords who managed 
affordable units were in no way held accountable to their residents. While there was a market 
mechanism for these tenants to vacate, expressing their displeasure through market behavior, this 
often simply served as justification for redevelopment, offering landlords an even bigger profit.  
Moreover, if ever there were an antithesis to development as conceived of by Sen and 
Appadurai, it would be development as conceived of by the proponents of TIF. Urban economic 
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development ceases to be in any way a discussion of how to improve the well-being of low-
income communities of color, which had been marginalized by decades of racist policies. 
Instead, cities came to view blighted areas as a place to be developed with inhabitants to be 
dispersed. 
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Chapter 6: The block today 
 
Executive Summary 
Having reviewed the history of American housing policy, Chapter 6 applies the same criticism to 
modern housing policy and demographic dynamics. It examines why white return has not 
resulted in the social awakening that theorists predicted. Ultimately, it shows that the 
combination of the use of police violence to regulate integrated spaces and continued resistance 
to integration on the exurban periphery conspire to preclude the social integration the country 
has sought. 
History 
Where, then, has this combination of suburban vouchers and urban displacement gotten 
us? Do we find ourselves to be a more integrated and well-adjusted nation? Sadly, the answer is 
no. All too often, those displaced by the demolition of public housing have moved to other poor 
communities of color (Goetz 2013). Indeed, poor-nonpoor segregation has increased, from a 
dissimilarity index of 12.6 in 1990 to 16.8 in 2000 to 18.4 in 2005 (Lichter et al 2012). Living in 
poorer areas continues to be associated with poorer health, education and employment outcomes. 
As of 2012, Lichter et al conclude, “Progress is seemingly at a standstill with respect to white-
minority segregation, yet concentrated poverty, at least at the neighborhood level, is on the rise” 
(Lichter et al 2012). Amidst all the shuffling, we have grown no closer. 
Indeed, in many ways we have simply moved around. Kneebone (2009) notes that, as 
cities have gentrified, the suburbs have seen a major rise in poverty, thanks to an influx of the 
displaced. In the first year of the Great Recession, suburbs added twice as money poor residents 
(578,000) as did cities (218,000) (Ibid.). She notes that, “Between 2000 and 2008, the suburban 
poor population grew almost five times as fast as the city poor population, so that suburbs are 
now home to almost 1.9 million more poor people than their primary cities” (Ibid.).  
In many cases, it is safe to assume that surge in poverty was also a direct result of the 
subprime mortgage collapse. However, there again, in that crisis, the enduring plague of racial 
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discrimination in the housing market, yet again, showed its continued strength. While the 
collapse affected all Americans, communities of color were especially hard hit. A 2009 study by 
the University of Minnesota’s Institute on Race and Poverty, found that “Black Twin City 
residents earning over $150,000, in comparison to whites earning below $40,000, were twice as 
likely to be denied a home loan. Those fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to get a loan were more 
than three times as likely to have a sub-prime loan” (Hamilton 2009). Having continued to 
encounter discrimination in the mainstream market, black Americans disproportionately sought 
out subprime loans, resulting in a disproportionate loss of wealth. In the end, many of them 
found themselves in poor suburbs rather than poor ghettos, still isolated from their affluent, white 
countrymen who fled to the city or further out into the exurbs. 
Moreover, the current wave of integration—to the extent gentrification has brought that 
about—has in many cases triggered violence and antagonism, similar to that seen in the 
integration of the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas, in years past, white vigilantes and state authorities 
engaged in violence and intimidation, because black people wanted to live in white 
neighborhoods, we now see discord springing from the fact that white people want to live in 
black neighborhoods. While it does not come in the form of a burning cross, nor is it even 
articulated as blatant animus, it still serves the purpose of establishing physical zones as “white 
space.” 
For this, let us take an example. The City of Minneapolis enforces laws governing petty 
crimes, including spitting and what is known as “lurking” or menacing loitering. There is 
ambiguity at work, as the sight of someone “lurking” is not terribly different than the image of 
someone simply standing in a public space. It is left to the discretion of the police and the other 
occupants of that public space to determine the nature of the lurker’s (or simple occupant’s) 
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position. In 2014, the ACLU published an assessment of the policing of petty crimes in 
Minneapolis. It found that, in 2012, blacks were six times more like than whites to be arrested for 
vagrancy and nine times more likely to be arrested for disorderly conduct (ACLU MN 2014). 
Before one leaps to indict a racist police force and excuse the informal panopticon, one has to 
examine the reporting of these crimes, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Proportion of witnesses, suspects and arrests for lurking, by race (2014) 
 
Source: Minneapolis Police Department 2015 
Figure 1 shows even more up-to-date data, from 2014, on the enforcement of anti-lurking 
laws. As the graphs show, far from being a proportional distribution, individuals reporting 
instances of lurking are 69% white, while those suspected or arrested for lurking were 59-60% 
black. The eyes on the street are not color blind. They are profoundly impacted by their implicit 
biases, and the result is that the commons, those public spaces meant to be shared, are de facto 
“white” spaces, in which people of color must strive to assimilate. 
What happens in the areas where this hegemony is established? They become safe for 
economic development. Guardians of areas of the city, such as Nicollet Mall, pursue qualitative 
metrics of making affluent visitors “feel safe.” Where they have succeeded in doing so, the Mall 
 29 
 
is lined with high-end bars, frequented by the professional class who work in the urban core and, 
at long last, live and play there as well. To the extent that low income individuals inhabit, they 
do so under constant informal surveillance.  
Why dwell so long on the issue of criminal justice, in a paper about integration and 
economic development? The reason is this. Critics of concentrated poverty rightly identified the 
desperation and isolation it brought about. However, they operated with the implicit assumption 
that if that concentrated poverty could be dispersed, then the previous inhabitants of those 
pockets of deep poverty could finally fully integrate into mainstream, American society. They 
would learn good habits and build social networks that would enable them to attain gainful 
employment. 
However, what the aforementioned analysis of anti-lurking laws shows is that, whether 
fueled by implicit biases or explicit contempt, racial antagonism persists. If white visitors to 
Nicollet Mall are calling the cops on their black counterparts simply for being present in that 
space, it seems reasonable to assume that they are not offering them job referrals. Moreover, the 
constant scrutinizing that youth of color endure has begun to engender nihilism and pessimism 
among those youth about whether they could ever have dark skin and be accepted into the 
American mainstream. This sense of alienation is in fact the very antithesis of the social renewal 
integration advocates have long predicted. 
Theory 
Having situated current development trends of gentrification within a broader narrative of 
cyclical integration and re-segregation, I now turn to applying the metrics of Sen and Appadurai 
to the present state of integration and development found in American cities. While aggregate 
income measures would indicate an overall improvement in the welfare of these cities, my 
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analysis shows that, if we reflect critically on contemporary trends in gentrifying neighborhoods, 
it is apparent that the socialization dreamed of by the likes of Wilson and Massey has failed to 
materialize. How can this be? Freeman (2006) explores gentrifying neighborhoods in Brooklyn 
and Harlem and finds that, even in those areas where diversity exists, the social ties that were 
supposed to acculturate and grant opportunity to low income, people of color do not develop.  
To understand why, we need to examine the policing of these neighborhoods: how it is 
supposed to work and how it does. In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs 
explains that the most important policing efforts come, not from the police, but from the 
residents of a community. She explains that, “[The public peace] is kept primarily by an intricate, 
almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, 
policed by the people themselves” (Jacobs 1961). Communities, therefore, experience either an 
upward or downward spiral. In the upward spiral, the presence of an informal panopticon 
enforcing standards of safety encourages more residents to enjoy public spaces, thereby 
multiplying its effect. Conversely, if people feel unsafe, they will retreat from these spaces, 
ceding them to the forces of what Jacobs describes as “barbarism.” 
This begs the question, however, of whether Jacobs’ faith in the unconscious mind is 
warranted. Listening to her, you get the impression that the unconscious is the psychological 
embodiment of blind justice, with its policing creating spaces welcoming to all. Unfortunately, 
recent research has shown that the unconscious mind is not home to our instincts towards 
equality and magnanimity. Quite to the contrary, Bertrand et al (2005) show that our unconscious 
mind is the sanctuary for latent, implicit biases that, for many of us, would be abhorred and 
scrubbed away by our conscious mind. That is to say, the police force of the subconscious is 
prone to racial profiling.   
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The devastating impact of the excesses of this psychological policing become clear, when 
they become more explicitly operationalized. In March of 1982, James Wilson and George 
Kelling, of the Manhattan Institute, published an article in The Atlantic, entitled “Broken 
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” In it they outlined a new theory for enforcing 
law and order in urban areas. Whereas the dominant school of thought among law enforcement 
entities had been that what limited resources agencies had should be directed towards combatting 
only the most violent crime, Wilson and Kelling put forth a diametrically opposite argument.  
They argued that extra care needed to be put into combatting petty crime, because letting 
those crimes go unchecked would telegraph a message that unlawfulness was tolerated in those 
communities, leaving people more inclined to commit more heinous crime. As the authors put it, 
“[S]erious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked” (Wilson 
and Kelling 1982). When people walk down the street and observe wandering drunks and unruly 
teenagers, the authors argue, those individuals get the sense that they are moving through an area 
in which disorder reigns. This will ultimately discourage them from going out in public freely, 
diminishing the number of eyes on the street which in turn leaves the community less safe. Go 
after the petty crime, they assert, and passersby and would-be criminals alike will get the 
message that disorder is not tolerated.  
By their own forthright admission, however, their policy is wholly rooted in perception. 
The case study they hold up is of a walking-beat cop in Newark. They acknowledge that the 
practice of having cops out on foot did not in fact lower crime, but residents nonetheless “tended 
to believe that crime had been reduced” (Ibid., 1). This perception was enabled by having cops 
engaging face-to-face with people on the streets, investigating potential disorder more deeply 
than they would, were they simply looking on from their squad cars. They are able to exert more 
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absolute control over residents of those neighborhoods, even to the point where those activities 
“probably would not withstand a legal challenge” (Ibid., 2). 
There is a key point, here, that the authors leave vague but which has profoundly shaped 
the impact of these policies. The goal of Broken Windows policies is to shape perception, but 
whose perception? Certainly, the focus is on imparting the message to criminals that disorder is 
not tolerated, but they also espouse the need to convey this message to passersby. In the end, the 
authors assert that police ought to “protect communities as well as individuals” (Ibid., 10). After 
three decades of Broken Windows, it is safe to say that this language is Orwellian. 
The “community” that has been protected by these policies is the potential community 
that could be formed post-gentrification. For residents of low-income communities of color, 
heavy-handed and invasive policing has left them feeling less protected than ever. Just as 
Haussmann saw the city in terms of potential capitalization and the beautification of the built 
environment, Broken Windows policing has treated current inhabitants as impediments to the 
creation of a safer and more prosperous community, of which they will not be a part. 
Lastly, the use of criminal justice as a vindictive means of reforming the poor also 
reminds us of the revanchists of Haussmann’s era. Indeed, Smith invokes this movement, in 
addition to the actions of Haussmann, as it epitomizes a fundamental shift in the ideology of 
urban economic development from ambivalence towards the poor to outright animosity. He 
chronicles rhetoric from anti-homeless initiatives in New York City, during the early 1990s, 
which highlighted the need to “take back” the city from low income residents who had “stolen” it 
(Ibid.). This antagonistic other-ing of the poor allows for the justification of dispersal, 
marginalization and displacement, rather than true uplift and endogenous development.  
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Conclusion 
The analysis of this paper has traced the evolution of American society over the course of 
numerous ebbs and flows of integration and segregation. It has touched on a broad swath of 
policy areas, from housing policy, to lending practices and criminal justice. It has ultimately 
culminated in an examination of present American social dynamics, as seen through the lens of 
gentrification. To what end, does it survey this broad swath of American history? It does so to 
make a point about the development—or more accurately lack thereof—of black Americans, in 
the aggregate. It shows the persistence of poverty, inequality and violence, through phases of 
both government- and market-initiated integration and re-segregation. It does so in pursuit of 
determining which variable it is that has inhibited the ability of communities of color to plan, 
aspire and exercise agency, indicators of the sort of development that Sen and Appadurai extol.  
That variable is power. At each stage of development, political and market mechanisms 
have conspired to keep black Americans in a subservient position. In the era of segregation, the 
FHA and its private counterparts exercised the power to use the market to maintain the 
“stability” of white neighborhoods, to determine where black Americans could live and to 
undermine the accumulation of assets that might have undergirded the social mobility of those 
black families. When that power network was prepared to entertain the idea of integration, it did 
so under the pretext that black Americans were depraved and pathological, in need of white 
tutelage. When it has decided to invest in blighted communities, it has done so in pursuit of a 
“higher and better use,” namely, a redeveloped neighborhood, free of its original inhabitants. 
What has been missing from all of this is a fundamental reformation of our understanding 
of community. America has not been willing to move more radically towards sharing assets with 
individuals it once treated as assets. In the absence of such a radical, economic metamorphosis, 
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its political commitments to freedom and equality have begun to ring hollow. Even as it elects a 
black President, the country continues to use economic depravity as an indicator of social worth. 
Michael Brown would be alive, so the story goes, if he hadn’t been such a “thug.” 
Simply put, black Americans cannot “Wish, want, need, plan or aspire” (Appadurai 
2004), if they fundamentally lack faith that they will occupy the same home, be welcome in the 
same community, nor perhaps even be alive, tomorrow. True development for that community 
can only come when the United States begins building communities that are co-owned, co-
governed and policed by cooperative eyes on the street. Until that day arrives, development in 
America will remain a shell game. 
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